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uring and since the 1976 Pound
Conference,' the rise of nonlitiga-
tion approaches has sparked an
intense debate as to whether nego-
tiation, mediation, and arbitration
are consistent with justice or rule of law,
and whether litigation itself is sufficiently
accessible to support a quest for justice.
This debate about procedural justice is
not limited to the United States, but rather
takes place in other countries too, in part
because the United States has become an
exporter of alternative dispute resolution
(ADR), as well as judicial reform.2
At the extremes, some commenta-
tors seem to believe that only their own
preferred form of dispute resolution
is consistent with justice. Litigation
sentimentalists' urge that litigation is
critically important to allow economic
and political underdogs to advance.
Mediation evangelists stress that media-
tion can result in better and more
enforceable agreements, and perhaps
even help us become better human
beings. Arbitration advocates urge that
their preferred technique allows dispu-
tants to voluntarily and knowledgeably
structure their own method of dispute
resolution, thereby maximizing free
choice and economic well-being.
Yet, although these perspectives are
founded on grains of truth, each is also
severely flawed. While litigation has at
times led to important social and politi-
cal change, litigation is also too often
inaccessible to many because of its
high costs and slow speed. Further, as
Professor Marc Galanter explained more
than thirty years ago, the powerful forcesVol. 19, No. I 2009/EXPERIENCE
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within a society have great ability to pro-
tect themselves in litigation and in the
lawmaking process upon which litigation
is ultimately dependent. 4
Mediation can indeed be beautiful. It
can help disputants recognize each others'
interests and resolve their disputes. Yet,
particularly when mandated by courts and
legislatures, mediation can impose high
costs, require expenditure of unproductive
time, and allow more powerful parties to
take advantage of weaker counterparts.
Arbitration, similarly, can work quite
well when accepted voluntarily but can
pose grave risks when imposed by one
disputant on another. When companies
are allowed to design a process of their
own choosing and then force others into
that process, we should not be surprised
that unfairness and self-dealing often
result. Regulation is not sufficient because
no legislature can ever think creatively or
broadly enough to proscribe every prac-
tice that a company might impose, and
litigation challenges are too costly and
time consuming to offer adequate protec-
tion from unfair arbitration provisions.
Further, voluntariness, while key, is
also not the guarantor of justice. Apart
from the psychological and linguistic
games that can be played around the
question of when is a seemingly volun-
tary process not voluntary, even truly
voluntary mediation and arbitration can
be critiqued for sometimes endangering
the welfare of weaker parties or failing to
result in public precedents. More broadly,
there are public interests in justice that
are not always protected even by honor-
ing the voluntary requests of disputants.'
So, where are we left in the quest for
justice? Does procedure matter? Can we
opine that one process or certain pro-
cesses are more just than others? To what
extent can we rely on any process to
serve the important goal, highly valued
by some, of fundamentally redistributing
power and interests in a given society?
Below I offer some observations on these
and related questions.
Does Procedure Matter?
I suppose no professor of procedure
could ever fail to say that procedure mat-
ters. U.S. Representative John Dingell's
famous line-"I'll let you write the
substance .. and you let me write the
procedure, and I'll screw you every
time" 6-- certainly carries a lot of weight
with me.
Substance without procedure can be
useless. The best laws in the world are
meaningless unless they can be meaning-
fully enforced. Procedures can be used to
give or deny great advantage.
The Limits of Procedural Reform
Despite the admitted power of proce-
dure, it is also clear to me that proce-
dure, on its own, has limited capacity to
accomplish significant reform against the
interests of the most powerful members of
a society. Although litigation enthusiasts
seem confident in the ability of litigation
to accomplish social reform, history is
replete with examples of how powerful
interest groups can limit such reforms.
For example, both substantive and proce-
dural legislation can be used to counter
advances that were made or might have
been made through litigation. In the area
of "tort reform," we have seen companies
seek to change the standards for liability,
expand defenses, reduce available dam-
ages, and limit or eliminate class actions
in order to make tort litigation more diffi-
cult for plaintiffs. With sufficient political
clout, potential defendants can immunize
themselves from the risks of litigation.
Similarly, even without making such
"rule" changes, powerful parties can gain
significant advantages over their litiga-
tion opponents by taking steps including
obtaining more and superior attorneys,
amassing greater expertise, securing the
appointment of judges likely to favor the
position of the powerful, and convincing
courts not to publish harmful precedents.
Nonlitigation procedures are similarly
vulnerable to preexisting power imbal-
ances. Whether one is talking about
consensual or nonconsensual processes,
such approaches do not allow us to side-
step or avoid the imbalances created by
the background law, wealth, or power.
While it is true that settlements
reached in mediation can (and often do)
reach issues beyond those that might
have been decided by a court, at least
under a self-interested theory of human
nature, there is no incentive for parties
to agree to things they find undesirable
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unless there is a risk a court would find
against them on those or other issues,
or the costs of proceeding to court are
too high, or other nonlitigation threats
make settlement the preferable option.
For example, groups in some other coun-
tries have espoused mediation as an
effective means to accomplish human
rights reformr or to limit domestic vio-
lence abusers' power over their victims. 8
However, it is very hard to see why a
human rights violator or domestic vio-
lence abuser would voluntarily relin-
quish its power in mediation unless such
powerful figure perceived a significant
risk it would in any event lose a related
claim in court or lose its power due to
political agitation. Moreover, it would
seem that some of the same kinds of fac-
tors that give powerful parties inherent
advantages in litigation would also give
them advantages in mediation. Although
some might like to believe that represen-
tation by an attorney is not essential in
mediation, it is likely that such repre-
sentation is very helpful to most parties,
Similarly, those more powerful parties
that can muster significant resources to
conduct research or gather evidence or
allies will have an advantage in media-
tion, just as they do in litigation.
In arbitration as well, the powerful
retain significant advantages. Even when
arbitration is entered into consensu-
ally, a party whose economic resources
are superior to its opponent can, for
example, secure representation that will
help it prevail; conduct more research
that will enable it to select a more favor-
ably disposed arbitrator; draft an arbitra-
tion clause in advance that will provide
advantages with respect to venue or
discovery or remedies; impose transac-
tion costs on an opponent that will lead
to concession or victory; or influence
neutrals to rule in its favor for fear of oth-
erwise losing future business. Just as in
litigation, a party whose political resourc-
es are superior to those of its opponent
can obtain more favorable underlying sub-
stantive law such that the arbitrator's rul-
ings are likely to favor its own position,
When arbitration is imposed predispute
by a powerful party on a less powerful
party, these risks, of course, are height-
ened substantially. The arbitration clause
itself may grant substantial advantages
to the powerful party by imposing high
costs on the opponent, eliminating certain
substantive claims, or limiting remedies
or procedures that might help the less
powerful party. Also, whereas the crit-
ics of binding arbitration have typically
focused on the extent to which arbitra-
tion impedes "little guys" from bringing
claims against powerful companies, of
late, arbitration is increasingly being used
as a weapon by large-company plaintiffs
against consumer defendants. Such com-
panies have found that when they seek to
bring debt collection suits, for example,
arbitration can allow them to obtain
an enforceable judgment more quickly
and cheaply than they would in small-
claims court. Yet, a number of courts
and commentators have taken issue
with the extent to which consumers'
rights to notice and a fair hearing are
adequately protected in such arbitrations. 9
Are Some Processes More Just Than Others?
If the effectiveness of procedures is lim-
ited, can we at least say some procedures
are more just than others? While it is
easy for me to identify certain processes
as unjust (e.g., trial by ordeal),10 I have
a much harder time endorsing any stan-
dard process over another.
In part, my inability to endorse one
form of dispute resolution as the most
just stems from my inability to come
up with a single satisfactory definition
of justice. I seek a procedural mecha-
nism that serves many interests, and I
recognize that at times these interests
are in tension if not conflict with one
another. Ideally, dispute resolution
would be accessible, fast, and fair, but it
would also protect rights under the law;
advance the interests of the less power-
ful; and serve such societal interests as
rule of law, transparency, and advance-
ment of desired substantive policies. I
also believe that promoting harmony,
balance, or reconciliation in a society can
be appropriate goals of a justice system,
although others see goals of harmony and
justice as conflicting with one another."
As I have discussed in detail else-
where, whereas certain of these interests
are served best by formal systems of jus-
tice, others are served best by informal
approaches. 2 The relative justice advan-Vol. 19, No. 1 2009/EXPERIENCE
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tages of litigation, arbitration mediation,
and negotiation, for example, depend for
me precisely on how the process is struc-
tured and on the nature of the dispute.
As Professor Lela Love has noted, the
various processes potentially offer differ-
ent kinds of justice. 3 Thus, whereas cer-
tain public disputes are more suited to
litigation, in order that they may provide
precedent and education to the society
as a whole, other more personal disputes
may best be resolved through negotiation
or mediation. Moreover, the difficulty in
defining justice and in making an appro-
priate choice between individual and
public interests in justice make it par-
ticularly impossible to choose one pro-
cess over another in all circumstances.
Instead, these various processes must be
creatively combined with one another
in order to serve our many, and to some
degree, conflicting, interests in justice.
How Can Procedural Reforms Enhance Justice?
I offer three suggestions for how we
can try to ensure that simultaneous use
of procedural reforms should enhance
justice. First, we need to recognize that
there are multiple forms of justice that
are entitled to our recognition and sup-
port. Justice is not all about "rule of law"
any more than it is all about conciliation
or efficiency or access,"
Second, and relatedly, we should
appreciate that multiple procedural
forms can serve justice. It is usually a
mistake to insist that any particular pro-
cedural approach is either desirable or
undesirable in all circumstances. Instead,
many approaches have virtues and detri-
ments depending on the situation, and
indeed the value of one procedure often
depends on the extent to which another
procedure may also be available.
Third, although I am to some degree
counseling diversity and tolerance, it is
also important to recognize that all pro-
cedural forms of dispute resolution are
easily corrupted. All procedures can be
turned to the advantage of the most pow-
erful vis-6-vis the least powerful mem-
bers of society, and we must be vigilant
to try to ensure that this corruption does
not occur. Litigation can be sabotaged by
undermining substantive law or elimi-
nating effective access for the less pow-
erful. Negotiation can be unjust when
powerful parties are allowed to use pri-
vate deals to hide their misconduct or to
deter future claims. Mediation can allow
powerful parties to harm weaker ones by
coercing settlements, deceiving weaker
parties into waiving their rights, or even
offering opportunities for physical harm.
Arbitration can allow the powerful to
obtain biased and unfair judgments
against the less powerful, to shield them-
selves from liability owed under the law,
or to prevent the public from learning of
misconduct.
Yet, while dangers of injustice are ram-
pant, there is no reason to end on a pes-
simistic note. If we are prepared to fight
for what is right and just, we can all help
ensure that various forms of procedure are
used to help the weak and to improve our
society. As lawyers, neutrals, policymak-
ers, and even academics, we can try to
ensure that underlying substantive laws
are just and that all forms of dispute reso-
lution are designed to protect the interests
of all members of society as well as the
public, rather than to entrench the inter-
ests of the most powerful. As stated in the
book of Deuteronomy, "Justice, Justice Ye
Shall Pursue."' 5 E
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